


Overconfidence is a Dangerous Thing: Mitigating Membership Inference Attacks by Enforcing Less Confident Prediction

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THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs)



Does the sensitive training set contain a target record?



Confidentiality violation



Guidance on the AI auditing framework

Draft guidance for consultation






https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2617219/guidance-on-the-ai-auditing-framework-draft-for-consultation.pdf 5

Training Set

Generated Image



Guidance on

https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2617219/guidance-on-the-ai-auditing-framework-draft-for-consultation.pdf ₆ Carlini et al., Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Models, USENIX'23




We need effective defense against MIAs!


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Poor privacy-utility trade off or requiring additional data

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


Poor privacy-utility trade off or requiring additional data




Our Work: HAMP

High Accuracy and Membership Privacy without additional data



Our Work: HAMP

A new way to combine soft label training, training regularization and output modification for privacy-preserving training!



Threat model

Adversary

- Knowledge:
 - Black-box adversary.
 - Half members and non-members.
 - Full defense knowledge.
- Goal: Membership inference

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
Defender


Knowledge:


- The private dataset only.
- Goal: Model with high accuracy & membership privacy


Diverse strategies




















Defense principle





MIAs exploit ML model's overconfident prediction on training samples





Mitigating ML model's overconfident prediction on training samples without jeopardizing model accuracy














HAMP

Training-time defense

Testing-time defense

HAMP

Training-time defense

Testing-time defense

Produce high-utility models with strong membership privacy

HAMP

Training-time defense

Produce high-utility models with strong membership privacy

Gain higher privacy without degrading accuracy


Testing-time defense

High-entropy soft labels


High-entropy soft labels

Original hard label

High-entropy soft label



High-entropy soft labels




Explicitly enforce the model to make less confident prediction

High-entropy soft labels


Original hard label

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


Explicitly enforce the model to make less confident prediction

Entropy-based regularization





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



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
Regularize the prediction confidence level











 \Box Modify all output vectors \rightarrow low confidence outputs.

□ How to obtain low confidence outputs?

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Utilize random samples as (highly probable) non-members.

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
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
Utilize random samples as (highly probable) non-members.








member sample




member sample







member sample





member sample





	Purchase100
	Texas100
5 datasets	Location30
	CIFAR10
	CIFAR100

5 datasets	Purchase100 Texas100 Location30 CIFAR10 CIFAR100	9 attacks	NN-based Loss-based Entropy-based Modified-entropy-based Confidence-based Likelihood-ratio attack (Li	Correctness-based Boundary-based Augmentation-based RA)
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Me DN 7 defenses SEI Ear Lat	vReg (CCS'18) emGuard (CCS'19) /IP (AAAI'21) LENA (USENIX'22) rly stopping (USENIX'21 bel Smoothing (CVPR'16 SGD (CCS'16)			

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	Label Smoothing (CVPR'1 DPSGD (CCS'16)	6)		Refer to the p	aper for details

TPR @ 0.1% FPR

TNR @ 0.1% FNR

2 metrics

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
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
TNR @ 0.1% FNR


Artifact https://github.com/DependableSystemsLab/MIA_defense_HAMP


Artifact Evaluated

NDSS











DPSGD: Strong privacy, but low accuracy

Key results





Summary



How to mitigate membership inference attacks with strong privacy protection and low accuracy drop?

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Perform to mitigate membership inference attacks with strong privacy protection and low accuracy drop?



Mitigating ML model's overconfident prediction on training samples without jeopardizing model accuracy.

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HAMP: A new way to combine soft label training, training regularization and output modification for privacy-preserving training!







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