



Simulation of Infrastructure Interdependencies Dynamics for Disaster Response Coordination


UBC – I2Sim Team



JIRP Canada Project

- PSEPC (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada)
- NSERC (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada)





UBC Team

- **Electrical and Computer Engineering**

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Dr. P. Kruchten
Dr. K.D. Srivastava
Dr. M. Armstrong
Dr. J. Hollman (Project Manager)
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Q. Han
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H. Rahman
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M. Sotoodeh

- **Civil Engineering**

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- **Computer Science**

Dr. K. Booth
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Dr. R. Rosenberg
J. Xu

- **Geography**

Dr. B. Klinkenberg
A. Cervantes

- **Sauder School of Business**


Dr. C. Woo
K. Monu

- **Simon Fraser University**

Dr. L. Bartram
C. Jiang

- **Clinical Psychology**

Dr. G. Poole
A. Clarkson




UBC's Partners


- British Columbia Transmission Corporation
- BC Hydro
- Telus Corporation
- Greater Vancouver Regional District
- Vancouver International Airport Authority



Collaborators




- David Grigg (UBC, Infrastructure & Services Planning, Assoc. Director)
- Gord Apperley (UBC Utilities, Director)
- John Manougian (UBC Hospital, Facilities Manager)
- Rick Critchlow (Fire Hall UBC)
- Sheena Vivian (BCHydro, Emergency Planning Manager)
- Doug Allan (JELC, GVRD, Project Manager)
- W.A.S. (Bill) White (PSEPC) (JELC)
- Gregg Smith (GVRD, Manager Corporate Services)
- Jim Gurney (BCTC, Manager Research and Development)
- Allan Galambos (Ministry of Transp.)
- Sharlie Huffman (Ministry of Transportation)
- Murray Day (JIBC, Director Emergency Management Div.)
- Jeff Cornell (JIBC)
- David Zajdlik (UBC Health & Safety Committee)
- James Whyte (Regional Manager for B.C. PEP)
- Maiclaire Bolton (Emergency Management Analyst – Seismic Hazards B.C. PEP)
- Kevin Molloy (YVR, Vice President & Chief Information Officer)
- Ivan Kusal (Telus, Director Corporate Business)




Our Mandate

“Develop innovative solutions to mitigate large disaster situations involving multiple infrastructure systems”

The Public Safety Problem



- Towns, municipalities and organizations are often not aware of the (hidden) interdependencies of their critical infrastructure.
- There is no mechanism to determine how their critical infrastructure system will react during an emergency, or what vulnerabilities exist in the system
- They do not have a way of validating and optimizing emergency response plans and decision making related to critical infrastructure




Result:

- *During an emergency or disaster, unexpected interdependencies appear that can cause emergency response plans to fail - sometimes catastrophically.*
- *Decisions are made that are not optimal. I.e. More lives may have been saved if better decisions had been made.*

Our Contribution: I2Sim –






Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies Simulator


- I2Sim allows users to model the critical infrastructure and the associated interdependencies of a town, municipality or organization
- A emergency event can be simulated and a full simulation executed to see the effects on critical infrastructure
- The simulator can model the effect of decisions made by emergency management command and control
- Different scenarios can be executed in order to select the best course of action for emergency response planning or execution
- Simulations can be connected together to model interdependencies between larger entities (eg. All of BC, Canada)




- Result:
 - Municipalities and organizations can validate and test their critical infrastructure and optimize emergency response plans.
 - CI Simulations can be “grown” to provincial or national level.

Complex Interdependent Multilayered Networks






I2Sim Ontology




Ontology

- From Greek ὄν , genitive τῆς οὐσίας : of being (part. of εἶναι to be)
- Who are the objects in our world, where are they located, what do they look like at a given moment, how and why they change in time?



I2Sim Ontology



- Multiple dissimilar systems need to be solved simultaneously
- Only external representation is needed to coordinate decision making across multiple infrastructures





I2Sim Model

A complex infrastructure system is made up of basic components:

1. **Cell** (Production Component): For example, a hospital cell requires inputs: electricity, water, doctors, medicines, etc. and produces outputs: patients healed
2. **Channel** (Transportation Component): The electricity to the hospital is carried by wires, the water is carried by pipes, the doctors are carried by the transportation system
3. **Dispatching** (Decisions Component): Determines resource allocation during scarcity






0 90 180 360 Meters

JIRP - I2C
UBC campus case





Cell

Cell

Cell

Cell

$x_7(t)$

$x_8(t)$

$x_5(t)$

Power Station

Hospital

Operability

$m = 60\%$

$m = 70\%$

healed people

$x_8(t) = m x_7(t)$

External Source

External Source

Water Station
 $m = 80\%$


Channel water



Channel water

Channel electrical

Residential
 $m = 40\%$


CC Model






Events that Change the System

- **Disasters** (e.g., earthquake) affect cell's m values and channel's a and τ values. They also affect the external sources values
- **Psychological Responses** (e.g., panic) affect cell's m values and channel's a and τ values
- **Human Processes** (e.g., bureaucratic red tape) affect cell's m values and channel's a and τ values
- **Human Decisions** determine distributor ratios when resources are limited




Indices

- **Operability (“m” factor):** Assuming full inputs are available, a power substation designed to deliver an output of 200 MW but because of earthquake damage can only deliver 100 MW has $m = 0.5$
- **Resource Availability (“r” factor):** Reduced cell output which is not due to reduced cell’s performance but to scarcity of resources. For example $r = 0.7$ means that due to lacking input or reserve resources the cell will only be able to produce 70% of its capacity even though $m=1$




Wellness

- **Wellness (“w” factor):** Capability of producing output:
$$w = \text{output_capable} / \text{output_rated}$$
- Wellness can deteriorate by a reduction in m , a reduction in r , or a reduction in both




I2Sim Architecture

Water Station Cell Human Readable Table (HRT)




Input (x)		Internal (m)		Output (y)
Power	Water	Pumps	m	Water
100%	100%	2	1.0	100%
100%	100%	1	0.5	50%
50%	100%	2 or 1	0.5-1.0	50%
0%	100%	2 or 1	0.5-1.0	0%
100%	50%	2 or 1	0.5-1.0	50%
100%	0%	2 or 1	0.5-1.0	0%
0%	0%	2 or 1	0.5-1.0	0%

Hospital Cell in Winter HRT




Input										output		
xw1	xe1	xs1	xh1	xe2	xs2	doctor s	nurse s	meds	patien ts	Long	Short	Emer gency
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%
100%	0%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%
100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	80%	80%
100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	0%
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
xw1 = water from the powerhouse to the hospital						xh1 = steam for sterilization of the surgery equipment surgery						
xe1 = power for the Koerner building						xe2 = power for the Purdy building						
xs1 = heating for the Koerner building						xs2 = heating for the Purdy building						

I2Sim Cell/Channel (CC) Model from HRT





I2Sim Linearized Cell Model

- Four-region approximation and corresponding table of input/output relationship:




- (I) $0.5x_1 + 0.5x_2 = y_1$
 (II) $0.25x_1 + 0.25x_2 = y_1 - 0.25$
 (III) $0.40x_1 + 0.56x_2 = y_1 + 0.06$
 (IV) $1.355x_1 + 0.75x_2 = y_1 + 1.105$


x1	x2	y1
100%	100%	100%
90%	100%	86%
50%	100%	63%
0%	100%	50%
100%	0%	50%
0%	0%	0%








JiIRP





JiIRP




States












I2Sim Scenario Play Out



Level 1 Coordination



We would like to redirect power. Can it be done?

We would like to redirect water. Can it be done?

CC

CC



CC

CC



CC

done


Decision Making Scenario Level 1



Decision Making Scenario Level 2



For Level 2, Level 1 decision A has already been taken and Level 2 proceeds from there. The combined results of multiple Level 2 decisions will create a new real-world picture which will prompt Level 1 decision B. Level 2 decisions will be the starting point for Level 3 decisions, etc.



Level 1 Coordination Emergency Operations Centre


EOC Moderator


Water Agent

Power Agent


Gas Agent

System of Systems







**Level 2
Coordination
Power System
Control Centre**




Power System Control Centre







**Level 2
Coordination
Water System
Control Centre**



Water System Control Centre




Simulation vs Reality




- “Before the battle is joined, plans are everything, but once the shooting begins, plans are worthless.” (Dwight D. Eisenhower during WWII)
- I2Sim merges together planned scenarios, simulation, and reality in a very fast real-time platform



Up Level Islanding





Regional Emergency Operations Centre
REOC Moderator
EOC Agent 1, EOC Agent 2, etc.





Jurisdictions



Down Level Ground Zero




Global CC Models Sharing




Internet Based
CC Models Database
Hosting: Akamai, VeriSign


2 CP2 = Coordinating Post
Level 2

Each post has access to
global CC data zoomed on
his area of operation (like a
GPS car navigator)



Communication Satellite






I2Sim

Mathematical Solution



Interdependencies Matrix




$$[\mathbf{T}][\mathbf{x}] = [\mathbf{w}]$$

- $[\mathbf{x}]$ = resources; $[\mathbf{w}]$ = sources
- $[\mathbf{T}]$ = Interdependencies Matrix; built from cell's m factors and channel's (a, Tau) factors
- Interdependencies Analysis
- Sensitivity Analysis
- Dynamic Trajectories Analysis


Interdependencies Matrix UBC Campus Case





Real-Time Performance

- I2Sim solves a piece-wise linear system between Delta-t steps. This allows for solution speeds 1,000 to 10,000 times faster than standard (non-linear) simulators
- I2Sim can solve a system of 3,000 cells with 15 inputs/outputs per cell (45,000 state variables) for a 10 hr scenario with Delta-t = 5 minutes in less than a second of computer time
- Interactive scenario playing is basically instantaneous
- Linear speedup in PC-Clusters (e.g., a cluster with 10 processors makes the solution 10 times faster)




The Human Layer

Psychological Issues


I2Psy

Psychological issues Linked to the Physical Layer: Using our Simulator




- Simulator effectiveness relies on its ability to identify:
 - Infrastructure weaknesses and interdependencies
 - Relief weaknesses and interdependencies
 - Resource allocation
- because these issues predict collective efficacy across social geography they support human capacity to cope and act during disaster

We Look First at Population-Related Issues




- Large-scale psychological issues
- Those “victimized” by the disaster
- Varying in
 - Vulnerability
 - Access to disaster support and services
 - Beliefs regarding consequences and probability
 - Psychological characteristics

For Later Consideration




- First Responders
 - Health care professionals
 - Police
 - Firefighters
 - Community workers
 - Volunteers

Some Psychological Issues



- Coping with serious illness as an analogy
- Analytical Focal Points
 - Key psychological factors that correlate with coping and outcome that
 - Can be operationalized
 - Can be quantified?

Perceived Vulnerability



- “Imaginability”
- “...it is necessary to examine the assumptions of everyday life and the effects of having these assumptions shattered” (Brown & Neal, 2001)




JIRP-Ottawa-2007

UBC Team





Collective Efficacy




- The “shared belief that a group can effectively meet environmental demands and improve their lives through concerted effort” (Benight, 2004)
 - *Communitas* – the momentary upsurge in collective unity and spirit associated with certain ritual events and social crises


Vulnerable Populations Loop



The Psychology of Evacuation




Panic as a Social Phenomenon




- Elevated by a lack of familiarity with place — exacerbating contagion
- Reduced by support — given and received
 - If you can't find loved ones, find someone
 - Called the “convergence effect”
 - To help others
 - Evidence of being alive and unaffected
 - Social comparison

Panic and Affiliation: A Social Attachment Model





- Classic conception: Panic = perceived imminent danger + limited escape options
- Newer conception: location of attachment figures more important than escape options

	Affiliation Present	Affiliation Absent
Threat Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Increased attachment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Low intensity avoidance of threat
Threat High	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Increased attachment•Orderly flight/evacuation•Occasional panic	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Mass panic — toward the familiar, not always away from danger



UBC Campus Case Study


UBC Campus Case Study




Why modeling UBC campus?

- The UBC campus shares many attributes of a small city
 - 47000 daily transitory occupants
 - 10000 full time residents
 - own utilities providers
- Information accessibility
- Good starting point before modeling larger area, such as GVRD

JIIRP-I2C Team Goals





- Analysis of interdependencies among critical infrastructures
- Develop methodologies of analysis
- Concentrate UBC's infrastructure information in a GIS
- Analyze infrastructure interdependencies
- Contribute to evolve from a *culture of reaction* into a *culture of preparedness*






The Human Layer: Policy Interdependencies Simulation

Policy Coordination



Policy Coordination Simulation






Policy Creation Based on Simulation

Useful to identify

- weakly coupled inter-agencies policies
- hidden knowledge
- unused resources


Help to preserve

- institutional memory






Interdependencies Visualization I2V

Visualizing Infrastructure Interdependencies in Emergencies



- GIS tools
 - Excellent to visualize snapshots of evolving events
- New Collaborative Visualization tools
 - “What if” scenario playing
 - Time/state
 - (un)certainty of data
 - Novel display environments

Campus Networks: GIS



0 135 270 540 Meters

JIIIRP - I2C
UBC campus case




iC Tea

0 135 270 540 Meters


JIIIRP - I2C
UBC campus case



UBC Earthquake Damage Assessment




BC31 Mean Damage Factors with Modifiers
Intensity VIII - UBC Campus





BC31 Mean Damage Factors with Modifiers
Intensity IX - UBC Campus



BC31 Mean Damage Factors with Modifiers
Intensity X - UBC Campus



Internet-based collaborative scenario analysis





Projects

Infrastructure	Dependency
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Power <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electricity <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Buildings <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bldgs&Roads 	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Medical Services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hospital <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Medicinesup- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bldgs&Roads 	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Water <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Buildings <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bldgs&Roads 	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gas	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Communication	<input type="checkbox"/> Current



Filter

Alarm Level Enable

Range: From: 0 To: 10


0 10

Alarm	Problems	General Log	Contact	Reference	Capacity	Confidence	Value
allbuildings.4			Property		Value		
Buildings			Attributes				
			Address2		2211		
			Area		8839		
			Area2		8838.52999804		



Projects ubc_case_Map

Infrastructure	Dependency
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Power <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electricity <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Buildings <input type="checkbox"/> Bldgs&Roads 	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Current
<input type="checkbox"/> Medical Services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital <input type="checkbox"/> Medicinesup- <input type="checkbox"/> Bldgs&Roads 	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input type="checkbox"/> Water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Water <input type="checkbox"/> Buildings <input type="checkbox"/> Bldgs&Roads 	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input type="checkbox"/> Gas	<input type="checkbox"/> Current
<input type="checkbox"/> Communication	<input type="checkbox"/> Current



Time Slider

Alarm Problems General Log Contact Reference Capacity Confidence Value

Property	Value
allbuildings.4	
Buildings	
Attributes	
Address2	2211
Area	8839
Area2	8838.52999804


Filter

Alarm Level Enable

Range: From: To:

0 10

GIS: Decision Makers Risk Mapping




Structural Assessment (MDF X) & Location of Decision Makers





Structural Assessment (MDF X) & Location of Emergency Decision Makers




Percentage of Damage




Decision Makers




% Damage




Decision Makers




Saved By Demo Version of Easy Video Capture!





Summary to Date


Industry Feedback



(26/FEB/07): Issues, Challenges

- Define coherent infrastructures **risk tolerance levels** from natural disasters by both industry and public
- **Standardize processes and policies** regarding the protection of CIs
- **Standardize the definition of CIs** across federal, provincial and local governments
- **Standardize CIs prioritization** across all levels of government
- Develop common and agreed **protocols for the sharing of CIs information** during emergency


Industry Feedback



(26/FEB/07): Positive Comments


- Benefits of CC model for data sharing among Ci's (PSEPC, Ministry of Transportation, Telus)
- Data base of simulation scenarios can preserve institutional memory after experts retire (GVRD, UBC Campus Planning)
- Dependency on foreign service providers (YVR)

Partnerships & Dissemination



- 80 hours of assistance from our partners; 2 Industry Workshops
- 37 internal documents; 9 conference papers; 2 Journal Publications
- 13 Researchers; 6 Doctoral Students; 7 Masters Students; 2 Postdoctoral Research Associates
- I2C Website for knowledge dissemination
<http://www.i2sim.ca>
- I2C Wiki for collaborative research

Continued Developments



1. Integration of visualization and decision support systems
2. Extensions of simulator and support systems:
 - City of Vancouver
 - City of Richmond
 - Vancouver international airport YVR
 - Vancouver 2010
 - Multi-cities coordination GVRD
3. Data exchange standardization
4. Multi-layered coordination

Seismic Risk Assessment of Vancouver

Building Damage - Preliminary Results

Fig. 7. Structural damage distribution in Vancouver.




Fig. 9. Monetary loss distribution in Vancouver.

